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Abstract 
This paper presents a new scheme to distribute secret shares using two trusted third parties to 
increase security and eliminate the dependency on single trusted third party. This protocol for 
communication between a device and two trusted third parties uses the piggy bank cryptographic 
paradigm. We also present a protocol to give law enforcing agencies access to sensitive information 
present on a cell phone or a device using secret sharing scheme. The ideas for classical systems may 
also be applied to quantum schemes. 
 
Introduction 
A trusted third party (TTP) can be defined as an entity which is trusted by both parties to facilitate 
communication. Imagine a scenario in which two parties completely trust the TTP and use it to 
exchange secrets, but it is compromised or it becomes dishonest, then the system’s security will be 
completely broken. Thus, relying on a single trusted party is risky [1]. We can use two TTPs to 
reduce the risk and increase security, and in this paper we describe a protocol to distribute the 
secret shares using two TTPs to eliminate the dependency on single trusted third party in case it is 
compromised or becomes malicious.  
Imagine a cell phone or a device with sensitive information which may be a threat to 
national security is in the custody of law enforcing agency but they cannot access it because it is 
password protected and the data wipes out automatically if the wrong password is entered few 
times. The cell phone or device owner company has also refused to provide any backdoor for 
information to be accessed stating the reason that the backdoor may come in wrong hands and 
hence the security of phones or devices in someone’s physical ownership may be compromised. 
This in fact was what happened in the case between FBI and Apple a few months ago. 
Keeping such scenarios in mind, the use of secret sharing scheme becomes logical. In this 
paper, we present a protocol in which the cell phone data or device data is accessible to law 
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enforcing agencies using secret sharing scheme and two trusted third parties. It eliminates the 
dependency on cell phone or device owned company to access the information.  
Background: Data Partitioning Scheme 
There have been several secret sharing schemes proposed in which the secret is partitioned and 
shared to various distributed servers. Shamir’s secret sharing scheme [2] is based on polynomial 
interpolation and maps the data on y-axis whereas another data partitioning scheme [3] is based on 
the roots of a polynomial on the x-axis.  
For background, consider the specific (k,n) threshold scheme based on polynomial roots [3] 
where k=2 and n=3. The data is partitioned into three pieces and stored on three servers (Fig. 1). 
Data reconstruction requires access to at least two out of three servers. This scheme may be called 
as (2,3) threshold scheme. The servers are chosen in such a way that only one piece of data goes to 
each server and this will secure the user’s data from being accessed by any of them until at least 
two of them agree and combine their pieces to recreate the original data.  
 
Fig. 1.  Data Partitioning Process 
The data is partitioned into three pieces using the fundamental theorem of algebra which 
states that every equation of degree three has three roots. Each of the partition is stored on a 
different server. To create n=3 partitions, first we create k=2 partitions. For this, we consider a 2nd 
order equation:  
 𝒙𝟐 + 𝒂𝟏𝒙 + 𝒂𝟎  = 𝟎               (1) 
Eq. (1) has 2 roots denoted by  {𝑟1, 𝑟2} ⊆ {𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑜𝑓 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑥 𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑠}. It can be rewritten as: 
    (𝒙 − 𝒓𝟏) (𝒙 − 𝒓𝟐) = 𝟎              (2) 
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In cryptography, we may use finite field ℤp where p is a large prime. We can replace 𝑎0 in (1) with 
data d ∈ ℤp,  then 
    𝒙𝟐 + 𝒂𝟏𝒙 + 𝐝 = 𝟎 mod p (d is input data)           (3) 
where 0 ≤ 𝑎i ≤ 𝑝 − 1  𝑎𝑛𝑑 0 ≤  𝑑 ≤  𝑝 − 1 (One may also use – d in (3) in place of d) 
This may be rewritten as: 
    (𝒙 − 𝒓𝟏) (𝒙 − 𝒓𝟐)  = 𝟎 mod p                                                             (4) 
where 1 ≤ 𝑟i ≤ 𝑝 − 1.  The 𝑟i are the data partitions. The term d is independent of variable 𝑥 and 
therefore 
𝒓𝟏 · 𝒓𝟐 = 𝒅 𝐦𝐨𝐝 𝒑                             (5) 
There are two restrictions on choosing the coefficients: 
1. Not all of them are simultaneously zero. 
2. They should be so chosen such that a solution to the equation exists in ℤp. 
Step 1: Choose randomly 𝑟1from a finite field ℤp. 
Step 2: Compute 𝑟2 ≡ d · (𝑟1)
−1 mod p. 
Step 3: Construct the 2nd degree polynomial:  𝑝(2) = (𝑥 − 𝑟1) (𝑥 − 𝑟2) mod p = 𝑥
2 + 𝑎1𝑥 −
d mod p 
Step 4: The roots 𝑟1, 𝑟2 of the polynomial p(2) are the data partitions. 
Step 5: We generate 3 × 2 matrix A whose all rows are linearly independent. Vandermonde 
matrix of the following form is a simple way to choose such a matrix. 
A= [
𝟏 𝒙𝟏
𝟏 𝒙𝟐 
𝟏 𝒙𝟑
] 
Step 6: We create n=3 partitions by computing: 
[
𝒂𝟏𝟏 𝒂𝟏𝟐
𝒂𝟐𝟏 𝒂𝟐𝟐
𝒂𝟑𝟏 𝒂𝟑𝟐
] [
𝒓𝟏
𝒓𝟐
]  = [
𝒄𝟏
𝒄𝟐
𝒄𝟑
] 
Step 7:  The partitions are denoted by the pair 𝑝𝑖  = {𝑥𝑖, 𝑐𝑖} , 1 ≤ 𝑖 ≤ 𝑛. 
 
Example 1: Let data d=12, prime p= 19, and k =2. We will use 2nd order equation to partition the 
data into two pieces, 𝑥2 + 𝑎1𝑥 − d = 0 mod p. Assume (𝑥 − 𝑟1) (𝑥 − 𝑟2) mod 19. We choose one 
root randomly from the field, 𝑟1 = 13. Therefore, 𝑟2 ≡ d · (𝑟1)
−1 𝑚𝑜𝑑 19 ≡ 12·(13)−1 mod 19 = 17. 
The equation becomes (𝑥 − 13) (𝑥 − 17) ≡ 𝑥2 − 11𝑥 − 12 = 0 mod 19. The coefficients  𝑎1 = 11 
and the partitions are 13 and 17. 
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Data Reconstruction 
Step 1: We construct  2× 2 matrix B by choosing the rows of matrix A corresponding to the given 
pairs  𝑝𝑖   and compute 𝐵
−1 . 
Step 2: We reconstruct the two (02) shares by evaluating:  
[
𝒓𝟏
𝒓𝟐
] = [
𝒂𝒎𝟏 𝒂𝒎𝟐
𝒂𝒊𝟏 𝒂𝒊𝟐
]
−𝟏
[
𝒄𝟏
𝒄𝟐
] 
Step 3: Data d= 𝑟1 · 𝑟2 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝑝                            
The Classical Piggy Bank Protocol for Communication between a TTP and the User 
The piggy bank protocol [4] can be used between a TTP and the user as it can provide 
authentication, secures double-lock cryptography and counters MIM attack [5]. In the first step TTP 
sends an empty sealed piggy bank to the user. On receiving, user inserts the secret and the 
decryption key of a coded letter into the box together. The user also prepares a coded letter to be 
sent separately. TTP receives sealed piggy bank and the coded letter from user. The coded letter is 
sent to authenticate the contents of the sealed piggy bank box. It is also a secret and cannot be in 
plain text. TTP unlocks the secret within the letter with the decryption key present in the box.  In 
this implementation of the piggy bank protocol for data, TTP obtains secret message (S) and key 
which is h(S). 
 
Step 1. TTP chooses a cryptographically strong random number R and the piggy bank 
transformation which is a one way transmission represented by f(R)= 𝑅𝑒  mod n, where n is 
a composite number with factors known only to TTP; e is the publicly known encryption 
exponent.  
Step 2. TTP sends f(R) to the user who multiplies it with its first secret S. The user sends 
S(𝑅𝑒  ) + K mod n to TTP in one communication and f(S)= 𝑆𝑒   mod n in another communication. 
Step 3. TTP uses its secret inverse transformation to first recover S and having found it can 
recover K. 
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Fig. 2. The Piggy Bank Protocol for communication between a TTP and the user 
 
Example 1:  
Let composite number n= 85 and the public encrypting exponent is e=5. The secret decrypting 
algorithm be 13 since 5×13 = 1 mod φ (85). Let TTP chooses random R=19 and computes 195  mod 
85 = 49 and send it to the user. Let user’s random secrets be S=6 and K=11. User computes 
6×49+11=50 and sends it in one communication and also 65  mod 85 = 41 to TTP in another 
communication. TTP uses its secret decryption exponent 13 to recover S: 4113  mod 85 = 6. Having 
found S=6, it computes 6×49+K =50, and recovers K=11. 
Protocol for Distributing Secret Shares Involving Two Trusted Parties using Piggy 
Bank Protocol 
TTPs are widely employed for distributing secrets. This makes the use of TTPs more critical and 
make them a main target for distributed systems and cryptography research. Keeping in view such 
situation, we are describing a protocol to distribute the secret shares using two trusted third 
parties (TTPs) to increase security and to eliminate the dependency on single trusted third party in 
case it is compromised (Fig. 3).  In this protocol, we are encrypting the secret share as well as the 
decryption key used to decrypt the secret share. Hence, we first decrypt the decryption key of 
secret share and then the secret share. The terms used in the protocol are explained as: 
Decryption key of the encrypted secret share decryption key: This is used to decrypt the 
decryption key of (encrypted) secret share and it is not encrypted itself. 
Decryption key of the encrypted secret share: This is used to decrypt the secret share. 
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Step by Step Protocol 
Step 1: Secret shares are created on user’s device using some appropriate process. 
Step 2: Only one unique secret share is encrypted and sent to TTP 1 along with the 
decryption key of the (encrypted) secret share decryption key. Each secret share is 
encrypted with a unique key. 
Step 3: The decryption key of the (encrypted) secret share is encrypted and sent to TTP 2. 
Step 4: TTP 1 sends unique recipient only one encrypted secret share and the decryption 
key of the (encrypted secret share decryption key.  
Step 5: TTP 2 sends the recipient the encrypted secret share decryption key. 
Step 6: Step 2 to Step 5 are repeated until every recipient receives its secret share. 
Step 7: Every recipient can decrypt the secret share by first decrypting the encrypted secret 
share decryption key using the decryption key received from TTP 1 and then decrypting the 
encrypted secret share by the decryption key received from TTP 2. 
                        
Fig. 3. Protocol for Distributing Secret Shares Involving Two Trusted Third Parties 
 
Application: Accessing Cell Phone/Device using Secret Sharing Scheme and Two 
TTPs 
The above mentioned protocol can be applied in a variety of applications i.e. Cloud Computing. We 
are providing an application of the protocol keeping in view the scenarios presented in the 
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Introduction. The data is partitioned into three pieces and stored on the servers of law enforcing 
agencies, judicial administration and cell phone/device owner company in such a way that only one 
piece of secret goes to each authority (Fig. 4). Data reconstruction requires access to at least 2 out 
of 3 servers.  
Law enforcing agencies cannot access cell phone or device until one of other two combine 
their secret share with them. It is assumed that cell Phone or device owner companies would never 
share their secret share until it is the matter of national security because they would never want to 
lose the trust of people. In case, it is the matter of national security and cell phone or device owner 
company has denied to share its secret, the judicial administration can give its share to law 
enforcing agencies and access the cell phone or device. The number of servers can be n and any 
(k,n) secret share can be used to implement this. The decision to select authorities whom the 
secrets are sent is also on the will of the implementation authority.  
 
Fig. 4. Protocol for Accessing Cell Phone/Device using Secret Sharing Scheme and Two TTPs 
Quantum Secret Sharing 
Now we come to quantum cryptography [6]. The concept of quantum secret sharing has been 
investigated and different schemes have been proposed. The procedure in which a message is split 
into various parts and all of them are required to read the message is described in [7]. A mechanism 
has also been shown to implement this procedure using GHZ states. The advantage of quantum case 
is the detection of eavesdropper because his presence will introduce errors. The concept of (k,n) 
threshold scheme is that a quantum state is divided into n shares and only k of those shares are 
needed to reconstruct the secret, but any set of k-1 or less shares reveal absolutely nothing about 
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the secret [8]. Quantum no-cloning theorem puts a restriction on threshold schemes and requires 
n<2k and in our case n=3, k=2 and hence 3<2(2) = 3 <4, thus obeys the no-cloning theorem.  
 
Sharing a three-state a qutrit (quantum trit) among three people [7]: 
|0> -> |000> + |111> + |222>  
|1> -> |012> + |120> + |201>  
|2> -> |021> + |102> + |210> 
 
Every person is holding either |0> or |1>, or |2>, so has no information about the encoded state. 
But, any two people out of three can reconstruct the secret. For example, Alice and Bob, holding 
first two shares, then subtract the value of first from the second (mod 3). By doing this quantum 
mechanically, phase is also disentangled, thus reconstructing the state even if it is in a quantum 
superposition. This is an example of ((2, 3)) quantum threshold scheme in which any secret can be 
reconstructed by any two people but one person alone has no information. 
Quantum Piggy Bank Cryptography Protocol 
The Quantum mechanical version of piggy bank cryptography protocol is presented in [9]. The 
protocol can be as follows in the scenario of TTP and the user: 
Step 1. TTP applies the transformation UB on a random polarization state which is the cover 
state X, and sends n qubits of it to the user.  
Step 2. The user applies UA on the received n qubits to form UAUB (X) and sends them back to 
TTP in one communication. 
Step 3: Somewhat later the user sends U+A (Y) in another communication in m qubits where Y 
is the secret message bit (m << n). 
Step 4. TTP applies U
+
B   on the received bunch of n cover qubits and then performs tomography 
to get the transformation UA and then he applies this transformation on the second received 
communication to get secret message bit Y. 
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Fig.5 Quantum Piggy Bank Cryptography Protocol [9] 
Security Analysis 
In proposed protocol, we are using two TTPs and sending encrypted secret share via one TTP and 
its decryption key which is also encrypted via other TTP. This provides the confidentiality to the 
secret shares even in the case when one of the TTPs is compromised. If TTP 2 is compromised, the 
Eve will only have the encrypted secret share decryption key and not the secret shares. As the 
secret share decryption key is also encrypted, it provides another level of security to the secret 
shares and ultimately the secret. If TTP server 1 is compromised, the Eve will only have encrypted 
secret shares but not its decryption key and using better encryption technique and long decryption 
key will also make the brute force attack impossible for the Eve.  
Use of Piggy Bank Protocol between an TTP and the user prevents Man in the Middle (MIM) 
attack if this protocol uses cryptographically strong RNG (Random Number Generation) algorithm 
or complex hash function. Both parties can introduce onetime pad or any other technique for 
authentication resource to recognize the misinformation from Eve, if she gets holds of the secret 
message. Piggy bank can also provide authentication.  
Data partitioning scheme is implicitly secure as less than 2 shares cannot deduce any 
information about the secret. Eve has to access at least two servers to construct the secret.   
Conclusions 
This paper presented a new scheme to distribute secret shares using two trusted third parties to 
increase security and eliminate the dependency on single trusted third party. This protocol for 
10 
 
communication between a device and two trusted third parties used the piggy bank cryptographic 
paradigm.  
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